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Abstract: On 23 October 2007, the European Court of Justice handed
down its much-awaited Volkswagen decision (Case C-112/2005),
following a suit launched by the Commission against the Federal Republic
of Germany in 2005. The Volkswagen statute, through which first the
Federal government together with the Land (federal state) of
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), later only Lower Saxony, had reserved a
veto against majority acquisition while only holding a fifth of all shares,
had come into the Commission’s purview as part of its large-scale
attempts at reforming and modernizing European company law. The
preparatory steps in that regard had been the suits brought by the
Commission with regard to other, ‘golden share’ provisions under
Portuguese, French, Belgian and English company laws in recent years.
Yet, the Volkswagen decision of the ECJ is of interest in more than one
respect. Not only does it constitute a continuation and further accentuation
of a line of argument that the Court has been unfolding over past few years
with regard to the Member State provisions in conflict with the EC’s
guarantee of the free movement of capital as laid down in Art. 56 EC. In
addition, the impact of the ECJ’s new ruling will have to be assessed in the
context of a high-powered regulatory field, in which member states, the
Commission, and the Court have been finding themselves in an ongoing
negotiation and contestation of historically grown company law regimes
and the pressures of globalizing capital markets. In that regard, the
Volkswagen decision raises a host of questions relating to the
Commission’s future agenda of corporate governance reform on the one
hand and the persisting differences among member states’ corporate law
regimes on the other. The following article lays out the Court’s reasoning,
before observing both the immediate and the more long-term effect of the
decision.
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THE ECJ, VOLKSWAGEN AND EUROPEAN
CORPORATE LAW: RESHAPING THE EUROPEAN
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM
Peer Zumbansen and Daniel Saam*

I. INTRODUCTION
On its website “The EU Single Market – Fewer barriers, more
opportunities”1, the European Commission lists the judgments by the
European Court of Justice [ECJ] dealing with the free movement of capital
under Art 56 EC Treaty (ex 73b). The latest update of this list is the
Court’s Volkswagen decision of 23 October 2007 (Case C-112/2005),
which the Commission had launched against the Federal Republic of
Germany on 4 March 2005.2 This suit, brought under Art. 226 EC Treaty,
had been long coming.3 That the Volkswagen statute, which effectively
gave the Federal government and the Land (federal state) of
*

Peer Zumbansen, Osgoode Hall Law School. Associate Dean (Research, Graduate
Studies and Institutional Relations); Director, CLPE, www.comparativeresearch.net, CoEditor in Chief, German Law Journal. Email: Pzumbansen@osgoode.yorku.ca; Daniel
Saam, Ph.D. Candidate, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University, Frankfurt. Email:
Saam@jur.uni-frankfurt.de. Thanks to the student editors of the German Law Journal at
Osgoode Hall Law School for research assistance and to CLPE Fellow, Kirsteen Shields,
Ph.D. Candidate at Queen Mary School of Law, University of London, UK, for helpful
comments and to my colleague Cynthia Williams and the participants in Osgoode Hall’s
Legal Theory Seminar on ‘Law and Economic Relations’ for fruitful discussions.
1

http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/capital/framework/court_en.htm.

2

Case C-112/2005, dated 23 October 2007, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany
“Volkswagen”.
3

See only the European Commission’s Press Release of 13 October 2004, IP/04/1209:
“The European Commission has decided to take Germany to the European Court of
Justice with respect to certain provisions of a 1960 law privatising Volkswagen (VW
law)...”, available at:
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/1209&format=HTML&a
ged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited 27 October 2007).

2
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Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) a veto against majority acquisition while
only holding a fifth of all shares4, would come into the Commission’s
purview, could hardly surprise, given the Commission’s activity with
regard to such ‘golden share’ provisions under Portuguese, French,
Belgian and English company laws.5 The most recent decision of the ECJ
in the case of Volkswagen is of interest in more than one respect. Not only
does it constitute a continuation and further accentuation of a line of
argument that the Court has been unfolding over past few years with
regard to the Member State provisions in conflict with the EC’s guarantee
of the free movement of capital as laid down in Art. 56 EC. The particular
mentioning of the importance of the free movement of capital in Art. 14
para. 2 EC for the realization of the internal market further underlines the
place of this guarantee within the larger political and economic
framework. After a longer period of relative marginalization in the
struggle over positive vs. negative integration6, the increasing
globalization of capital markets in the last decade of the 20th century has
moved the regulatory framework of capital to the forefront of national and
supranational policy makers. The extensive case law by the ECJ, which
the Commission lists on its Internal Market website7, forms only one
aspect of a larger-scale approach understood to improve the
4

See sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Gesetz über die Überführung der Anteilsrechte an der
Volkswagenwerk Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in private Hand [Law
concerning the transfer of shares in the VW limited liability company in private hands] of
21 July 1960, published in Bundesgesetzblatt [Federal Gazette – BGBl.] 1960 I, 585, and
BGBl. 1960 III, 641-1-1).
5

See, e.g., Johannes Adolff, Turn of the Tide? The ‘Golden Share’ Judgments of the
European Court of Justice and the European Capital Markets, 3 German L.J. No. 8
(2002), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=170, at para. 9
(dealing with the ECJ’s judgments of 4 June 2002 concerning the ‘golden shares’ under
Belgian [C-503/99], Portuguese [C-367/98] and French company law [C-483/99]); see
subsequently the Court’s ruling on golden share provisions under the English company
law, C-98/01, handed down on 13 May 2003, and Comission vs. Italy, C-174/04 as well
as Commission vs. The Netherlands, C-282/04 and C-283/04, 28 September 2006.
6

See Fritz W. Scharpf, Balancing Positive and Negative Integration. The Regulatory
Options for Europe. MPIfG Working Paper 97/8. Cologne: Max-Planck-Institute for the
Study of Societies, available at: http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/pu/workpap/wp978/wp97-8.html,
7

See, supra, note 1.
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competitiveness of the European economy.8 Other elements of this policy
initiative include rules pertaining to ‘company law and corporate
governance, accounting and auditing.’9 Here, in particular, the ‘European
Company Law scene’, so masterfully depicted in 1973 by Clive
Schmitthoff10, has been in dramatic motion for the last couple of years.
The long-standing attempts at adopting a European Company Regulation
and Directive (Societas Europaea - SE)11 as well as a Take Over Directive
finally came to an end. The struggle over the statute for the SE lasted for
three decades, twice the time it should take for the passing of a EU
directive governing corporate takeovers in Europe,12 an undertaking that
itself had been brought underway in 1989.13 Both attempts occupied a
European administration working with many of its Member States towards
8

See the Commission’s website’s announcement regarding the improvement of the
‘regulatory framework’, in which European companies operate with a view to making
them
competitive
‘in
global
markets’,
available
at:
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_45_en.htm (last visited on 27
October 2007).
9

Id.

10

Clive Schmitthoff, The Future of the European Company Law Scene, in: ibid., The
Harmonisation of European Company Law, 3 (1973).
11

E. Werlauff, The SE Company - A New Common European Company from 8 October
2004, 14 European Business Law Review [EBLR] 85-103 (2003); Christoph Teichmann,
The European Company - A Challenge to Academics, Legislatures and Practitioners, in:
4 German L. J. 309 (2003), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com; Vanessa
Edwards, The European Company - Essential Tool or Eviscerated Dream? 40 Common
Market Law Review 443-464 (2003); S. Ebert, The European Company on the Level
Playing Field of the Community, 14 European Business Law Review [EBLR] 183-192
(2003); T. L. Blackburn, The Societas Europea: The Evolving European Corporation
Statute, 61 Fordh. L. Rev. 695-772 (1993).
12

B. Pettet, Private versus Public Regulation in the field of Takeovers: The Future under
the Directive, European Business Law Review [EBLR] 381-388 (2000); Klaus-Jürgen
Hopt, European Takeover Regulation: Barriers to and Problems of Harmonizing
Takeover Law in the European Community, in Klaus-Jürgen Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch
(eds.), European Takeovers. Law and Practice (1992); Ronald J. Gilson, The Political
Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance
Environment, id.

13

Theo Raaijmakers, Takeover Regulation in Europe and America: The Need for
Functional Convergence, in Joseph A. McCahery/Piet Moerland/Theo Raaijmakers/Luc
Renneborg (eds.), Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and Diversity (2002).

4
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a ‘level playing field’ of companies in Europe.14 While during the 1990s,
one would have had the impression of European company law integration
losing its long-term momentum15, this clearly changed in the context of
the continuing debates over a European Company and a European Take
Over Directive, both fuelled by increasingly denationalising investor
activities and pressures to adopt domestic regulatory frameworks to global
demands for improved corporate disclosure and investment
opportunities.16 Finally, with the breakthrough at the 2000 Nice Summit
for the SE statute, which subsequently got adopted in 2001 and went into
force in October 2004, on the one hand, and with the all-exhausting
passage of an eventually, much watered-down Takeover Directive17 by the
European Parliament in December 2003, on the other, this long persisting
stasis seemed to have come to an end. Moreover, the European
Commission had seized upon the widespread uneasiness with the state of
affairs to install an expert commission, whose first mandate had been to
extrapolate the existing resistances against a European takeover régime
and to develop a model that would be likely to satisfy the opponents.18
With the group of experts’, under the direction of Dutch law professor,
Jaap Winter, presenting the report shortly after, the Winter group received
a follow-up mandate, which might be seen as the starting point of a new
phase in European company lawmaking: the group launched a
14

See already Commissioner Karel von Miert’s speech at the 1998 Davos World
Economic Forum, “What does a level playing field mean in the global economy?”,
available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp1998_031_en.html
(last visited 27 October 2007)

15

Jan Wouters, European Company Law: Quo Vadis? 37 Common Market Law Review
257-307 (2000).

16

See, e.g., Matthias Casper, German capital market law – a permanent reform, 5 German
L.J. 367 (2004), at 367, available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=412.

17

Silja Maul/Athanasios Kouloridas, The Takeover Bids Directive, 5 German L. J. 355366 (2004), at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdf/.Vol05No04/PDF_Vol_05_No_04_355366_Private_Maul_Kouloridas.pdf.

18

J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues related
to Takeover Bids', (2002) at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlgreport_en.pdf.
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comprehensive online consultation on an outline for a ‘Modernized
Company Law in Europe’—three months after presenting the first report
to the public.19 The second report by the High Level Group was made
available after a careful analysis of the input from the online consultation
in November 2002.20 Soon after, in May 2003, the European Commission
issued its Communication to the Council and the European Parliament:
‘Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward’ (‘Action Plan’).21
In the two years since the Commission’s Action Plan, the Commission has
brought on the way a number of initiatives that build on the detailed
programme laid out in 2003.22 These initiatives are developed against the
background of intense reform debates in the various Member States, not
only with regard to the apparently inevitable move towards independent
directors as mandated by the USA’s 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act,23 but also
in light of increasing pressure on existing systems of corporate
management and industrial relations, in particular Germany’s model of co-

19

See
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/index.htm.

20

See J. Winter, 'Report of the High Level Group of Company Law Experts on A Modern
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe', (2002) at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/company/modern/consult/report_
en.pdf.

21

Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2003/com2003_0284en01.pdf.

22

For an updated overview, see
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/index_en.htm and
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/ecgforum/index_en.htm.

23

J. N. Gordon, 'Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information Order
of Sarbanes-Oxley', (2003) Harvard John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and
Business, Discussion Paper No. 416 (April),
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391363 at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_
program/law_economics/wp_listing_1/wp_author?exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=
69105&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DWP216.pdf; R. Thompson, 'Corporate
Governance After Enron: The First Year', (2003) Vanderbilt University Law School, Law
& Economics, Working Paper No. 03-13,
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=429622 at www.ssrn.com

6
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determination.24 Such activities, then, are being pursued in a complex
regulatory environment of domestic statutory law on the one hand, and of
norms produced by transnational regulatory bodies on the other.25 One
result of this transnationalization of corporate law norm generation is that
the negotiation of regulatory approaches to questions of corporate control,
ownership and – not least – responsibility26 - is taking place today under
conditions that differ markedly from traditional international law making.
The emerging regulatory environment is at once discursively open to
experiences and proposals coming forth from norm entrepreneurs that
comprise both public, private and hybrid actors such as national
governments and courts, but also corporations, expert commissions, and
supranational standard setting organizations.27 But it is also more
accentuated with regard to the degree to which legislative policies and
domestic path dependencies of political choices and historical, socioeconomic developments, which shaped a particular regulatory regime, are
coming to the fore. As a result, the choices available to law making bodies
on the transnational level are not confined to different models of
‘harmonization’ on the one hand and ‘regulatory competition’ on the
other.28 Instead, the proliferation of norm entrepreneur contributes to a
24

See, e.g., Theodor Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance:
Inside a Law Making Process of a very new nature, (2001) 2 German L. J. at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43; Klaus-Jürgen Hopt, Corporate
Governance in Germany, in Klaus-Jürgen Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Capital
Markets and Company Law (2003); see also Jens Dammann, The Future of
Codetermination after Centros: Will German Corporate Law move closer to the U.S.
Model? 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law 607 (2003).

25

See e.g. the overview of corporate governance codes in Europe, issued and constantly
updated by the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), at
http://www.ecgi.org/.

26

See Simon Deakin and Suzanne Konzelmann, Corporate Governance after Enron: An
Age of Enlightenment, in: After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US, 155 (Joseph McCahery & John Armour eds.,
2006).

27

For an in-depth discussion of this regulatory environment, see Gralf-Peter Calliess/Peer
Zumbansen, Rough Consensus, Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law,
forthcoming.

28

Peer Zumbansen, Spaces and Places: A Systems Theory Approach to Regulatory
Competition in European Company Law, 12 Eur. L. J. 534 (2006); Peer Zumbansen, The
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more complex law-making environment, in which political choices are
constantly challenged by other considerations and models of market
ordering, including moral values and economic concepts. In addressing the
regulatory challenge as to which norms are most appropriate to the
governance of the corporation in a globally competitive setting,
boundaries between company and capital markets law become as relative
as those between corporate governance, corporate social and
environmental responsibility, and industrial relations. To be sure, the
transnational reality of norm creation challenges the role and competence
of traditional law-makers as they enter a de-nationalizing market of norms
and ideas. By way of illustration, that the European legislator should
concern itself with issues as precarious and contested as executive
compensation,29 while the Court of Justice marches on with increasing
pressure on Member States’ rules on company seats,30 are clear signs of an
ever-faster diversifying agenda for Brussels’ European company law
programme, which can be properly understood only in relation to the
transnational discursive and regulatory environment just described.
This background sheds a particular light on the recent series of ‘golden
shares’ decisions handed down by the ECJ. The most recent, Volkswagen
decision goes to the heart of the ongoing reform policies of European
company law, while powerfully touching on the long-standing debate over
converging corporate governance standards. While there is an important
body of literature underlining the relevance of historical trajectories and
associated competitive advantages to national differences (the so-called

Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor Law, 13 Ind. J. Glob. Leg. Stud. 261
(2006).
29

See the Commission Recommendation of 14 December 2004, available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/company/directors-remun/index_en.htm.
30

Kilian Bälz/Theresa Baldwin, The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): the
European Court of Justice Decision in Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact
on German and European Company Law, in: No.12 3 German L. J., available at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_issue.php?id=214;
C.
Kersting/C.
C.
Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003 and its Effects on
Practice, (2003) 4 German L. J. 1277-1291; Walter Bayer, Die EuGH-Entscheidung
Inspire Art und die deutsche GmbH im Wettbewerb der europäischen Rechtsordnungen,
BetriebsBerater 2357-2366 (2003).

8
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Varieties of Capitalism school31), there is wide agreement that these
distinct national systems are under severe and growing pressure to
converge.32 The privatization of public welfare systems and the increased
tendency to base pension and retirement financing on the capital market33
have coincided with a worldwide competition for stock market
investments.34 As a consequence, traditional stakeholder-oriented systems
of corporate governance are increasingly challenged as to their capacity to
provide the transparency and management control necessary for their
success in the global competition for investments.35

31

Peter A. Hall/David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in: Varieties
of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage 1 (Hall/Soskice
Ed. 2001); David Soskice, Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and
Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980's and 1990's, in: Continuity and Change in
Contemporary Capitalism 101 (Kitschelt/Lange/Marks/Stephens Ed. 1999); Ronald
Dore/William Lazonick/Mary O'Sullivan, Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth
Century, 15 Oxford Review of Economic Policy (Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y) 102 (1999);
Robert Boyer, Coherence, Diversity, and the Evolution of Capitalisms - The Institutional
Complementarity Hypothesis, 2 Evol. Inst. Econ. Rev. 43 (2005), 45-47; see also
Matthew Allen, The varieties of capitalism paradigm: not enough variety?, 2 SocioEconomic Review 87 (2004).

32

See, e.g. Eddy Wymeersch, Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance
Patterns in Western Europe?, in: Corporate Governance Regimes. Convergence and
Diversity 230 (Joseph McCahery/Piet Moerland/Theo Raaijmakers/Luc Rennebog eds.,
2002); Peer Zumbansen, European Corporate Law and National Divergences: The Case
of Takeover Law, 3 Wash U Glob Stud L. Rev. 867 (2004); Mathias Siems, Die
Konvergenz der Rechtssysteme im Recht der Aktionäre (2006).

33

Friedrich Kübler, The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some
Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate
Structures, 2 European Business Organization Law Review [EBOR] 669 (2001);
Friedrich Kübler, The Rules of Capital Under Pressure of the Securities Markets, in:
Capital Markets and Company Law 95 (Hopt/Wymeersch Ed. 2003).

34

Theodor Baums, Interview: Reforming German Corporate Governance: Inside a Law
Making Process of a very new nature, 2 German Law Journal at:
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/past_issues.php?id=43 (2001); Theodor Baums,
Company Law Reform in Germany, 3 J. Corp. L. Stud. 181 (2003).

35

Henry Hansmann/Reinier Kraakman, Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law?, in:
Corporate
Governance
Regimes.
Convergence
and
Diversity
56
(McCahery/Moerland/Raaijmakers/Renneborg eds. 2002).
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The Volkswagen decision brings these conditions into sharper focus yet.
As was to be expected, the Court found it comparatively easy to identify
the Volkswagen provisions to be in violation with the Treaty’s free
movement of capital guarantees.
A closer look at the Court’s reasoning as well as at the context in which
this case has been decided sheds light on the dynamics between creating a
European competitive business environment on the one hand and doing
justice to the political choices at the Member State level on the other. One
week after the ECJ’s decision, Lower Saxony’s premier announced that
his government planned a revision of the Volkswagen statute that would
accommodate the Court’s ruling while respecting the historical
‘compromise’ of 1959.36 This compromise had resulted in giving the
capital owners, the Unions and the government a representative and codeciding stake in Volkswagen with the effect of ‘protecting’ the company
from domination through one shareholder.37 Considering the prominence
of the theme of co-determination within the global debate over the
convergence or divergence of corporate governance standards38, the
Volkswagen case offers a dramatic perspective on the regulatory
multilevel dynamics of contemporary corporate law making. It opens – for
a final encore? – the curtain for the Rhenish model of capitalism, behind
which government, corporations and unions are understood as partners in a
market ordering exercise.39 The political-social compromise, which has
marked the German post-war economic order during the Bonn Republic
has been under quite some strain with the deepening process of European

36

“VW Gesetz soll wiederbelebt werden”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung
(online edition), 27 October 2007, available at:
http://www.faz.net/s/RubD16E1F55D21144C4AE3F9DDF52B6E1D9/Doc~E238C927C
CDBC4EED9C79CEE5DD0506CD~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last visited 28
October 2007).

37

See ECJ, Case C-112/2005, dated 23 October 2007, Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany “Volkswagen”, paragraph 22; see also, infra, sub B I.
38

For references, see Jens Dammann, The Future of Codetermination after Centros: Will
German Corporate Law move closer to the U.S. Model? 8 Fordham Journal of Corporate
& Financial Law 607 (2003)

39

See only Michel Albert, Capitalisme contre Capitalisme (1991).
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integration and the exposure of national markets to global competition.40
As a result, past national political trajectories have not necessarily been
found to provide a clear guide towards future developments – instead, as
documented by the diversification and proceduralization of supra-national
law-making in the areas of social policy, employment and now corporate
law41 - they have become contested variables in a search of best practices.
The Volkswagen decision must be seen as a crucial contribution to this
search.

II. THE HOLDING AND CONTEXT OF THE
VOLKSWAGEN DECISION OF 23 OCTOBER 2007
The Volkswagen Decision of 23 October 2007, instantly emphasized as a
milestone in Europe’s development of an open market42, was announced
five and a half years after the ECJ had delivered the initial three
judgements on the compliance of national golden share agreements with
the free movement of capital under Art. 56 EC.43 Some of Europe’s most
visible symbols of economic protectionism had effectively been targeted
40

Friedrich Kübler, The Impact of Equity Markets on Business Organization: Some
Comparative Observations Regarding Differences in the Evolution of Corporate
Structures, 2 European Business Organization Law Review [EBOR] 669 (2001)

41

Catherine Barnard/Simon Deakin, In search of coherence: social policy, the single
market and fundamental rights, 31 Industrial Relations Journal, 331-345 (2000);
Catherine Barnard/Simon Deakin, 'Negative' and 'positive' harmonisation of labor law in
the European Union, 8 Colum. J. Eur. L., 389 (2002); David Trubek/Louise Trubek, Hard
and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: The Open Method of Cooperation, 11
Eur. L. J. 343 (2005); Colin Scott, New-ish Governance in the EU and the Legitimacy of
the EU, CLPE Research Paper 17/2007, available at:
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1003824

42

See Landler, At Volkswagen, a historic change at hand, Herald Tribune (online
edition), 22 October 2007; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard refers to the ECJ ruling as a “big
breakthrough for the EU single market” in: Porsche poised to buy VW, The Telegraph
(online edition), 24 October 2007.

43

See, supra, note 5.
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by the Commission and by the Court.44 In order, however, to better assess
the possible consequences of this newest development, an in-depth
analysis of the reasoning of the Volkswagen Decision is necessary.

A. THE COURT’S REASONING
The European Commission filed an action under Art. 226 EC against the
Federal Republic of Germany on 4 March 2005.45 The Volkswagen statute
contained three provisions that the Court found to be in violation of the EC
Treaty provision on the free movement of capital. First, section 2 (1)46 of
the Volkswagen Statute caps the voting rights each single shareholder can
exercise to 20 percent of the company’s overall voting rights, secondly,
paragraph 4 (3)47 provides that the quorum that is needed for an approval
of a management resolution is – other than the statutorily needed quorum
of 75 percent – increased to 80 percent. Finally, paragraph 4 (1)48 grants
the Federal State and the Land of Niedersachsen the right to appoint two

44

Landler, Porsche to raise stake after court strikes down ‘Volkswagen Law’, Herald
Tribune (online edition), 23 October 2007; the relevance of the ECJ’s golden share
judgments for the Volkswagen Law had already been pointed out by Hartmut Krause in
the year 2002, see Hartmut Krause, Von “goldenen Aktien” dem VW-Gesetz und der
Übernahmerichtlinie , Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 2747 (2002).

45

See the Commission Application for Case C-112/05 of 4 March 2005, available at:
http://www.curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?lang=en.

46

Paragraph 2 (1) of the Volkswagen statute provides: “The voting rights of a shareholder
whose par value shares represent more than one fifth of the share capital shall be limited
to the number of votes granted by the par value of shares equivalent to one fifth of the
share capital.”

47

Paragraph 4 (3) of the Volkswagen statute provides: “Resolutions of the general
meeting which, under the Law on public limited companies, require the favorable vote of
at least three quarters of the share capital represented at the time of their adoption, shall
require the favorable vote of more than four fifths of the share capital represented at the
time of that adoption.”

48

Paragraph 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute provides: “The Federal Republic of
Germany and the Land of Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen) may each point two members
of the supervisory board on condition that they hold shares in the company.”
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members of Volkswagen’s supervisory board on condition that they are
shareholder in the company.
Before assessing each of these provisions in detail, the ECJ addressed the
German submissions to the proceedings. In effect, the German government
had argued that the Volkswagen statute ought not be regarded as a
‘national measure’, since it had arguably emerged from a contract between
individuals and groups, which had – during the post-war years – claimed
rights in respect of the then ownerless Volkswagen company.49 In
transposing this very agreement into a statute, the German state had
merely exercised its formal legislative power without passing a substantive
legislative act.50
The ECJ took issue with this contention and found the adoption of the
Volkswagen statute “a manifestation par excellence of state authority.”51 It
held that since the contested provisions were based on an act of the
German legislation and that the German legislator alone was entitled to
modify or rescind the Volkswagen statute, the statute could not be
regarded as a private law agreement but constituted a national measure.
At first glance, this scrutiny might seem to be of lesser importance when
compared to the voting restrictions and their alleged infringement of Art.
56 EC. The historical events that gave rise to Germany’s argument
concerning the ‘national measure’, however, lend the dispute a highly
symbolic dimension. In 1959, an agreement between the workers and trade
unions of Volkswagen on the one hand and the Federal State and the state
of Lower Saxony on the other concluded an ongoing dispute about the
ownership of the then legally ownerless but flourishing Volkswagen
undertaking. This dispute arose in the aftermath of WW II due to a set of
unique circumstances, characterized not only by the remarkable dynamics
of Volkswagen’s post-War economic success but also by the firm’s
specific stakeholder constellation. After WW II, the Volkswagen factory,
promptly recommenced operations in 1945. As it was located in the
49

See: Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, delivered on 13 February
2007, Case C-112/05, Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany “Volkswagen”,
paragraphs 25 -26.

50

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 45.

51

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 27.
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British occupied zone, the British military government temporarily
assumed the decisive power to determine the fate of the factory. When the
British withdrew from the occupied zone having failed in their attempts to
sell the company to one of its competitors, Volkswagen became virtually
ownerless.52
Notwithstanding, the ‘ownerless’ Volkswagen factory, flourished as a
business during the end of the 1940s and the 1950s. During the 1950s
several claims with regard to the ownership of the company were asserted.
Amongst those claiming ownership were those who had, on a weekly
basis, contributed payments to facilitate the erection of the plant during the
1930s. Such efforts were expected to culminate in the opportunity to
purchase one of the VW cars, the so-called Kraft durch Freude- Wagen
(‘strength through happiness’ car).53 Therefore after the British had ceded
responsibility for the company, the company’s employees, the unions as
well as the Federal state and the Land of Lower Saxony put forward their
ownership claims.54 This dispute and a number of related court procedures
concerning the ownership eventually contributed to a destabilization of the
company. With VW having been a powerful symbol of German
productivity and the country’s innovative capacities, the five parties
agreed on a compromise that took the form of a multilateral contract.
Under this contract, the employees and trade unions agreed to abandon
their alleged rights in VW if the State were to guarantee their protection
against any single controlling shareholder.55 The provisions contained in
this agreement later formed the Volkswagen statute.56
The Court had to address several aspects of the Volkswagen statute. Yet,
given the particular context of converging corporate governance regimes
in Europe against the background of a worldwide search for better
52

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 24.

53

The former name Volkswagen (people’s car) was dismissed by Hitler in 1939, see,
supra, note 49, paragraph 20.

54

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 25.

55

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 22 and 23.

56

For a historical overview of the Volkswagen law, see, supra, note 49, paragraph 17 to
29.
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corporate governance principles, the Court’s reluctance of engaging at a
deeper level with this particular set of circumstances during its assessment
of the first contested provision of the statute, is remarkable. It would have
been appropriate to emphasize the particular historical circumstances that
gave rise to the contested contract.

1. RESTRICTIONS OF THE FREE MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
The European Commission had filed the action against the German state
claiming that the relevant provisions of the Volkswagen statute infringed
both the free movement of capital (Art. 56 EC) and the freedom of
establishment (Art. 43 EC). The ECJ scrutinized whether the provisions of
the Volkswagen statute complied with the EC’s fundamental freedom of
free movement of capital. Therefore the ECJ first emphasized that the
legal frame that had enabled the state to exercise a considerable influence
on the company’s governance, had been developed by the provision in
Section 4 (3), which allowed the public sector – in fact the Land of Lower
Saxony57 – to preserve a comfortable blocking minority with regard to
major decisions of the company’s management. Secondly, this degree of
influence would be supplemented by Section 2 (1), which capped the
voting rights for every shareholder at 20 percent.58 Since the two
provisions taken together could at least potentially deter direct investors
from other Member States the Court recognized a restriction of the
freedom under Art. 56 paragraph 1 EC.59
With regard to Section 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute, the Court found
that the right of the Federal State and Lower Saxony to appoint two
representatives to the supervisory board (Entsenderecht) infringed the free
movement of capital. The Court found the provision to be granting the
authorities a level of influence disproportionate to their actual investments.
57

The German Federal State has sold its shares and is, therefore, no shareholder of the
Volkswagen plc anymore.
58

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 51.

59

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 56.
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Section 4 (1) of the Volkswagen statute would therefore constrain the
other shareholders’ possibilities both to effectively participate in the
management of the company. Consequently, it would also be liable to
deter direct investors from other Member States from investing in the
company’s capital.60
2. JUSTIFICATION OF THE RESTRICTIONS
Finally, the ECJ rejected Germany’s submission according to which the
contested provisions of the Volkswagen statute are at least justified by
“overriding reasons in the general interest”. Those would – due to its
history – be included in the law itself and could be expressed as “equitable
balance of powers”.61
In accordance with its settled case law62 the ECJ scrutinized whether a
restriction of a fundamental freedom could be justified under the EC.
Some, however narrow, justifications could arise within the context of
certain domestic tax issues or of public security as stated in Art. 58 EC.63
Outside of these justifications not applicable in this case, a nondiscriminatory restriction could be justified by overriding reasons in the

60

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 66.

61

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 70; the argument of the German state refers to the origin
of the Volkswagen statute as an agreement between the then participating economic
actors, see above, supra, note 49.

62

E.g. ECJ, Case C-483/99 of 4 June 2002, Commission v. French Republic “Soiété
Nationale Elf Aquitaine”, paragraph 45; ECJ, Case C-463/00 of 13 May 2003,
Commission v. Kingdom of Spain, paragraph 68.

63

Art. 58 (1) of the EC provides: “The provisions of Article 56 shall be without prejudice
to the right of Member States: (a) to apply the relevant provisions of their tax law which
distinguish between taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place
of residence or with regard to the place where their capital is invested; (b) to take all
requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, in particular
in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial institutions, or to lay
down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for purposes of administrative
or statistical information, or to take measures which are justified on grounds of public
policy or public security”.
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general interest.64 Accordingly, each Member State is generally entitled to
define the standard of protection for the general interest. This entitlement
is, however, limited again by the Treaty and, in particular by the principle
of proportionality. In order to comply with the latter, the “measures
adopted (must) be appropriate to secure the attainment” of the pursued
objective and go not beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.65
The ECJ held that Germany had failed to provide sufficient justification
for the voting restrictions. It rejected Germany’s contention that the voting
restrictions served the protection of interests of employees and of minority
shareholders. While the Court recognized with regard to the latter, that the
“desire to provide protection for such shareholders may also constitute a
legitimate interest”66, it did not find the concrete voting restrictions to be
conducive to that end. Remarkable is the Court’s use of the word “also” in
the given context, as this can only be read as an implicit reference to the
employees’ interests, mentioned just before.
Another statement in the Court’s opinion seems in odd contrast to its
careful, if not reluctant engagement with the issue of protected interests in
the remainder of the opinion. When the ECJ found that the German
government had failed to explain how the contested provisions of the
Volkswagen statute are appropriate and necessary to preserve the jobs
generated by Volkswagen activity67, this can in fact be understood as
another reference to the arguments raised in conjunction with the
restrictions protecting a legitimate interest. While this line of interpretation
may already border on speculation, the concrete wording of the here
64

ECJ, Case C-483/99 of 4 June 2002, Commission v. French Republic “Soiété Nationale
Elf Aquitaine”, paragraph 45; ECJ, Case C-463/00 of 13 May 2003, Commission v.
Kingdom of Spain, paragraph 68.; According to ECJ, Case C-98/01 of 13 May 2003,
Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, paragraph 49 and
ECJ, C-282/04 of 28 September 2006, Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands,
paragraph 35, each Member State, whose provisions are subject to a procedure according
to Art. 226 EC is obliged to submit factual circumstances that the respective restrictions
are justified by overriding requirements of general interest.

65

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 73.

66

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 77.

67

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 80.
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referred-to passages suggests that the Court was not entirely blind to the
basis of the contentions made by the German government. Compared to
the formal argument with which the Court found the VW statute to be a
“national measure”68, its reasoning with regard to the voting restrictions
does signal the Court’s awareness of the particularity of the arguments
brought by the German government.

II. PREPARATION OF THE DECISION BY ADVOCATE GENERAL
RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER’S OPINION
For observers, the Court’s ruling could hardly have come as a total
surprise. Looking at the carefully phrased Opinion by Advocate General
(AG) Colomer of 13 February 2007, the general outline of the case had
become visible already some time ago. Remarkably, the same AG had
already authored the Opinions for previous actions against domestic
golden share arrangements in other European Member States.69 As with
many other cases, however, here too we find a certain discrepancy
between the scope of issues addressed by the AG and those subsequently
taken up by the Court.
1. INFRINGEMENT OF ART. 56
With regard to the alleged infringement of Art. 56 EC, the ECJ basically
followed the Opinion delivered by AG Colomer.70 The AG had argued
that the provisions of the Volkswagen Law constituted non-discriminatory
restrictions, which objectively favoured the public authorities. “Those
protectionist consequences”, he reasoned, lead to a “dissuasive effect” of
the Volkswagen statute to investors from other Member States,
constituting – in accordance with the ECJ’s settled case law – a violation
68

See, supra, note 37, paragraph 26 to 29.

69

See the opinions delivered in the initial judgements on national golden share
arrangements, see: ECJ, Case C-367/98, Commission v. Portugal; ECJ, Case C-483/99,
See, supra, note 64; ECJ Case C-503/99, Commission v. Belgium.

70

See, supra, note 49.
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of the free movement of capital.71 Since neither the protection of the
employees’ interests nor the protection of the minority shareholders was
sufficient to constitute a general interest, the restrictions could not be
justified.72
2. THE AMBIVALENT RELEVANCE OF ART. 295 EC IN THE VOLKSWAGEN
DECISION

As alluded to before, the Opinion of the AG contains remarkable
considerations concerning Art. 295 EC. The Court, however, chose not to
address these in its judgment at all. According to Art. 295 EC, “this Treaty
[the EC] shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member State’s governing
the system of property ownership”. In contrast to his earlier Opinions73,
AG Colomer rejected the applicability of Art. 295 EC in the context of the
Volkswagen statute.74
He quite remarkably qualified it to be “curious” that the German
government had not referred to Art. 295 EC.75 This statement, presumably,
derives from his formerly expressed views about the role of Art. 295 EC.
In his Opinion, Art. 295 EC would entitle Member States, when
privatizing formerly state-owned undertakings, to maintain extraordinary
company rights by imposing golden share arrangements.76 The AG opined
that if a Member State were free to decide whether an undertaking is either
being thoroughly privatized or socialized, Art. 295 EC must a fortiori offer
the possibility to partly privatize while enacting golden share
arrangements (as a kind of “minus” to the complete privatization).77
71

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 89.

72

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 103.

73

See, supra, note 64.

74

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 47 through 56.

75

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 47.

76

See Stefan Grundmann/Florian Möslein, Die Goldene Aktie, Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht 319, (2003), 2003, at 339.

77

See Stefan Grundmann/Florian Möslein, Die Goldene Aktie, Zeitschrift für
Gesellschaftsrecht 319, (2003), at 339.
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According to this argument, golden share arrangements would have to be
subsumed under the term “rules in Member State’s governing the system
of property ownership” (Art. 295 EC) and, therefore, would fall outside of
the purview of the EC Treaty.
Yet, the omitted references to Art. 295 EC are not curious at all if one
considers that the ECJ had constantly rejected the applicability of Art. 295
EC in similar cases. In the Klaus Konle decision of 1997, the ECJ had
briefly stated that Art. 295 EC did not have the effect of exempting a
domestic system of property from the fundamental rules (which include
the fundamental freedoms) of the Treaty.78 In other words, as long as a
domestic statute infringed a fundamental freedom, the Member State
should not be able to defend its golden share arrangements by mere
reference to Art. 295 EC.79
The Volkswagen Opinion of the AG shows a drastic change of his former
interpretation of Art. 295 EC. In his Opinion on the Volkswagen case, the
AG dismissed the applicability of Art. 295 EC, as he found the present
case to exhibit “substantial differences in relation to the cases, which the
court has determined to date”.80 The former judgements arose in the
context of privatized undertakings. Central to those rulings had been
measures, which “constituted means by which the public authorities could
participate in certain activities of vital importance to the national
economy, with the purpose of imposing an economic policy strategy”.81
However, in the AG’s view, the Volkswagen statute did not fall into this
category, since it would concern neither one of the country’s key branches
nor a system of property ownership.82 Conclusively, the AG’s formerly
broad applicability of Art. 295 EC now seems reduced to domestic “key
branches”. But, since it remains entirely uncertain how those are to be

78

ECJ, Case C-302/97, Klaus Konle v. Republic of Austria, paragraph 38.

79

See also ECJ, Case C- 483/99, supra, note 62, paragraph 44.

80

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 50 and 51.

81

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 50.

82

See, supra, note 49, paragraph 51; Opinion in Cases C-367/98, C-483/99, C-503/99,
supra, note 80, paragraph 62.
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identified in the first place83, the AG’s interpretation of Art. 295 EC
forfeits practicability.

III. COMPATIBILITY OF THE VOLKSWAGEN DECISION WITH
PREVIOUS ‘GOLDEN SHARE’ JUDGMENTS
As seen, the ECJ stuck with its previous judgements on golden share
agreements. The definition of the term ‘free movement of capital’ is still
informed by the nomenclature set out in Annex I to Council Directive
88/361/EEC of 24 June 1998. It, however, remains questionable whether a
Directive can provide definition for terms of the Treaty itself. In order not
to render the free movement of capital illusory84, no domestic instrument
may be created if that instrument may be liable to actually or potentially
impede foreign direct investors from acquiring a stake in the capital in
order to participate in its management or in its control. In this reading, Art.
56 EC was a “general prohibition on restrictions on the movement of
capital”, which “goes beyond the mere elimination of unequal treatment
on grounds of nationality”.85 The Volkswagen decision, thus, builds nicely
onto the string of cases, in which the Court has been executing a gradual
shift from striking down discriminatory arrangements to the erection of
parameters obliging member states to provide – within a specific
proportionality test – justifications for arrangements seen as likely
impediments for transnational commerce.86 With the Volkswagen
decision, as with the golden share decisions before it, but also the other

83

This is subject to ongoing political discussions throughout Europe, for instance, see
Dietmar Hawranek/Christian Reiermann, Gutes Geld, böses Geld, Der Spiegel 27/2007,
p. 84, 85; see also Daniel Saam, Protection for domestic core enterprises against direct
investments by foreign-owned investment funds, 1 Legal Latitudes: Newsletter for the
Transatlantic Business and Law Community 57 (2007), available at:
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/legallatitudes/documents/Legal_Latitudes_Vol_01_
No_04.pdf (last visited 28 October 2007).
84

ECJ, Case C-112/05, supra, note 2, paragraph 54 and 55; ECJ, Case C-483/99, supra,
note 62, paragraph 41; ECJ, Case C-367/98, supra, note 69, paragraph 45.

85

E.g. ECJ Case C-367/98, supra, note 69, paragraph 45.

86

Adolff, supra, note 5, sub paragraph 2.
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highly prominent company law cases in Centros87, Ueberseering88 and
Inspire Art89, the Court has continues to effectively strike into the
lingering negotiations, contestations, deadlocks and entrenchments in
Europe with regard to corporate mobility, the freedom of establishment
and the free movement of capital. The institutional, law-making role of the
Court within this multi-level regulatory scenario is as fascinating as is the
set of substantive issues at stake. Thus, the Volkswagen decision
constitutes another formidably challenging contribution to the already
complex development of European corporate law. It is this combination of
the interplay between the Commission’s attempts at moving European
company law forward with the different strategies of the member states to
resist or to adopt to the ‘pressure to reform’ in light of globalizing capital
markets on the one hand with the unique place held by the ECJ in this lawmaking laboratory on the other that makes the field a prime subject for the
study of transnational law-making.

87

Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-Org., 1999 O.J. (C 136) 3; see E. Wymeersch,
Centros: A Landmark Decision in European Company Law, in T. Baums,K. J. Hopt and
N. Horn (eds.), Corporations, Capital Markets and Business in the Law. Liber Amicorum
Richard M. Buxbaum (2000); W. F. Ebke, Centros - Some Realities and Some Mysteries,
48 Am.J. Comp. L. 623 (2000); see also Harald Halbhuber, National Doctrinal Structures
and European Company Law, 38 Common Market Law Review 1385-1420 (2001)

88

Case C-208/00, Ueberseering BV v. NCC Nordic Construction Company
Baumanagement GmbH, ECR 2000, I-9919; see hereto Kilian Bälz & Teresa Baldwin,
The End of the Real Seat Theory (Sitztheorie): The European Court of Justice Decision in
Ueberseering of 5 November 2002 and its Impact on German and European Company
Law, in 3 German L.J. No.12 (2002), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/current_ issue.php?id=214; W.-H. Roth, 'From
Centros to Ueberseering: Free Movement of Companies, Private International Law, and
Community Law', 52 ICLQ 177-208 (2003)

89

Case C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabriken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art
Ltd., 2003 O.J. (C 275) 10; see Kersting & Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of
30 September and Its Effects on Practice, in 4 German L.J., 1277-91 (2003), available at
http://www.germanlawjournal.com /article.php?id=344;
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C. THE VOLKSWAGEN DECISION IN CONTEXT
It would be no exaggeration to state that an assessment of what
characterized European company law, would differ wildly if not from year
to year than surely when comparing a several-year stretch of time with
another. The regulatory agenda of the Commission, not least evidenced by
the sheer omnipresence of Internal Market Commissioner, Charlie
McCreevy90, has been in a constant state of growth, refinement and
differentiation. Any assessment, then, will be one of a process rather than
of a reached endpoint. It is important to keep the mixed nature of
European company law making in mind, when beginning to speculate
about the impact of this recent, prominent judgment. Thus, trying to bear
in mind the diversity of historically grown, socio-economic structures that
gave rise to different company law regimes in the various member states,
when evaluating a new company law judgment from the Court, is a
necessary precondition to make sense of it, but is it sufficient? The level of
activity of the Court must be seen in comparison and correlation with that
which we can observe in Brussels. With an eye to the Court on the one
hand, and another one on fast-evolving processes of ‘company law reform’
in member states all throughout the EU, the Commission has been a fast
learner and adaptive facilitator of regulatory learning. The Commission
has proven to be an initiator and apt consumer of company law related
expertise needed to better understand the challenges to reform of a market
finding itself enlarging at a dramatic pace, with the combined challenge to
inspect existing and evolving regimes with a view to the West and to the
East.
The Volkswagen Decision, then, was not a decision coming out of
nowhere, nor would anybody suspect it to have little practical impact. Yet,
the evaluation of the decision’s impact poses a considerable number of
challenges, given the complexity of the field described above. In the
interest of narrowing our first attempts at an analysis, it is certainly fair to
say that the decision was handed down in a context of legal and socioeconomic contestation of the way that corporate boards are to be staffed,
controlled and that corporate power is being exercised. The mere
mentioning of the company’s name brought to the forefront of any debate
90

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mccreevy/index_en.htm
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about Volkswagen’s future in the European and global market its famous,
if much contested model of worker involvement, itself connected with the
company’s intriguing historical origins. It was in fact through the eyes of
the many journalists, predominantly in Europe and in North-America, who
instantly commented on the Court’s ruling, that we have been beginning to
discern the dimensions of the current form of Andrew Shonfield’s
“Modern Capitalism”91 and its possibly forming future trajectories. The
state of nervousness that characterizes many observations of the present
development is a mere reflection on the complexity we are facing when
discussing forces of change, of convergence and divergence.
Once we begin, however, to look beyond the prominent place occupied by
the questions concerning Volkswagen’s co-determination in order to
resituate these concerns within a larger framework of considerations about
corporate governance and the mixed, public and private nature of the
norms constituting that regime, comprised of hard and soft law, of direct
and increasingly powerful, indirect forms of regulation, we are able to
appreciate the unavoidably political nature of the current discussions about
corporate governance. Looking at but also beyond co-determination forces
us to take a closer look at the supporting regulatory and socio-economic
frameworks in which co-determination but also corporate governance
elements such as board structure, compensation, power allocation and
shareholder structures are presently being reconfigured. Looking beyond
co-determination as such, then, allows us to understand it as one element
in a larger field of interrelated institutions that find themselves in dramatic
change. It is for that reason, that, yes, the Volkswagen decision underlines
the already long-held suspicion that corporate law is deeply political, but
that there is, at the same time, more than that. It is important, but not
sufficient to reread Berle’s “Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution”92 to
91

Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism. The Changing Balance of Public and Private
Power (1965)
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Adolph A. Berle, The Twentieth-Century Capitalist Revolution (1954); see also Berle’s
assessment of Shonfield, 82 Pol. Sc. Q. 628 (1967), where Berle attests Shonfield to have
written “the first serious and scholarly review of the modern capitalist revolution”, which
he [Berle] places in a fruitful and complementing dialogue with Galbraith’s The New
Industrial State, finding that both authors concur in their assessment of the need to
expand public control over private enterprise, recognizing that economic goals are
diminishing in relative importance, gradually giving way to expertise-based, scientific
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understand the present forces at work in a transnational arena of public
and private actors contesting and constantly redrawing the ‘boundaries of
the firm’. It is important to read Karl Polanyi93 today, but it is important to
read it in the present context, which is marked by significant advances in
the theory of institutional economics94, by a fast evolving expertise in the
‘varieties of capitalism’95 and theories of ‘embeddedness’96 and
comparative corporate law.97 It is against this background that
contemporary assessments of corporate law have to be complemented by
an analysis of the regulatory environment of companies on the one hand
and their internal differentiation and ongoing experimentation as risktaking, profit-seeking, researching and developing organizations on the
other.98 It is only through the combination of these two perspectives that
considerations of societal development. Thanks to Osgoode Hall Ph.D. candidate, Fenner
Kennedy-Stewart, for having pointed us to this review.
93

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1944)
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Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance
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and the evolution of conventions, organizations and institutions, 5 Structural Change and
Economic Dynamics 205-220 (1994); Daniel Kiwit & Stefan Voigt, Überlegungen zum
institutionellen Wandel unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses interner und externer
Institutionen, 46 ORDO 117-148 (1995)
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See, e.g. John W. Cioffi, Corporate Governance Reform, Regulatory Politics and the
foundations of Finance Capitalism in the United States and Germany, 7 German L. J. 533
(2006), available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=732.
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See only Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of
Embeddedness, 91 American Journal of Sociology 481 (1985), and Mark Granovetter,
The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes, 19 J. Econ. Persp. 33 (2005); see
the ciritique by Jens Beckert, The Great Transformation of Embeddedness. Karl Polanyi
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Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in: Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law
1161-1191 (Mathias Reimann/Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006), available at:
http://www.ecgi.org/wp/wp_id.php?id=231; see earlier Mark J. Roe, Comparative
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we take the lessons of earlier, astute observers of the company seriously
today.
Thus, drawing out the explicit and implicit aspects of the Volkswagen
decision of 23 October 2007, can we understand it as part of a laboratory
of contemporary corporate law making in progress. As journalists
worldwide were fast to identify the central aspects and consequences of
the ECJ’s ruling99, we began to be alerted to what many believe was at
stake in this case. In light of the long-standing emphasis on Germany’s
Rhenish capitalist company and industrial relations regime, the case was
seen to strike at the heart of German corporate governance100, as it targeted
one of Europe’s foremost model companies of worker codetermination.
When, however, a leading German newspaper pointed to that very fact
while at the same time highlighting that this model did show – “often in
disgusting manner”- the excesses of this regime101, the degree of
contestation marking this field, onto which the Court found itself treading
(or, rushing?), eventually began to emerge. Two aspects, in particular,
make this case remarkable. For one, its concrete circumstances belie the
general intention of this and the previous rulings intended not only against
capital market barriers, but also in favor of opening up domestic markets
for foreign investment. In the case of Volkswagen, the expected outcome
of the ECJ’s intervention into the Wolfsburg Comfort Zone is a cleared
path for family-held Porsche to succeed in its longstanding attempt at
acquiring a majority of Volkswagen.102 This is particularly poignant as the
99
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Volkswagen ruling comes, as we saw, in a ever accelerating series of
Commission initiated legal actions against member states found to be
entertaining protectionist policies.103 In the complex regulatory
environment of European market integration, such policies have naturally
been confronted with a host of member state reactions, often appealing to
the national interest at stake. It is in this context, that both the French and
German governments have recently undertaken attempts at identifying and
protecting so-called ‘core industries’.104 It is a dynamic and tension-laden
field, on which the Commission will continue on its quest to identify
European based corporations with so-called special rights, an undertaking
that has gained even more momentum with the recent Volkswagen ruling.
Meanwhile, the Volkswagen ruling is bound to have notable impacts on
the German domestic labor regime. With Volkswagen becoming a likely
takeover victim for Porsche after the ECJ’s decision, something that DER
SPIEGEL called the ‘triumph of the Piechokratie’105, the fate of workers’
co-determination in one of Germany’s largest employers is in a precarious
state. Central to the predicament is the competition between two models,
which instead of complementing each other, have increasingly been
positioned in an oppositional and, in fact, competitive relation. Workers’
co-determination, as forming a constitutive part of the two-tier board
Justice against the so-called Volkswagen Law, which shields the carmaker from foreign
takeovers, won’t be ushering in a wave of suitors from overseas, but will pave the way
for the luxury car manufacturer to take full control of its midmarket compatriot.”
103
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structure in German stock corporations with more than 500 employees, has
been a constant target of critique and polemics, while its accompanying
regime of Betriebsräte (work councils) continued to fare comparatively
more favorably.106 Rushing in, biased observers fall victim to the long
pronounced, comparative efficiency of works councils cooperating with
corporate management in salvaging periods of crisis and austerity.
Meanwhile, however, they might perhaps too easily dismiss board codetermination.107 Certainly, both sides are half correct, half mistaken. The
signal sent to foreign investors by the German system of board codetermination has for some time now been received as at best a mixed
one.108 Yet, to place all of one’s hopes on works councils as an alternative
to or possible substitute for co-determination in the hope of maintaining a
working relationship between management and labor, risks prematurely
cutting ties with a historically grown industrial relations regime, which not
only comprised the role of unions in labor-capital negotiations, but also
induced far-reaching policies regarding vocational training, workplace
protection and, to a very limited degree, corporate decision making.109
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How effectively work councils will be able to negotiate the increasing
tensions between the corporation and its employee stakeholders, will
unfold within a highly contentious environment of business policy
making. The room to manoeuvre for all implicated actors is likely to
become smaller rather than bigger. The greatest victim of this fight over
co-determination is, to be sure, a better understanding of the company, in
particular of its internal and external environment, where employees,
consumers, creditors and the ‘society at large’ are not merely stakeholders.
Looking beyond the deeply entrenched classifications and demarcation
lines along which shareholder interests are clearly distinguished from
those of stakeholders, would allow us to return with a more sober look at
the company itself. It would be here that we would begin to assess the role
of employees as something more than an ‘investor risk factor’, but an
essential, powerful asset for the firm’s economic performance. Of course,
it is unlikely that we would even be able to see that deep into the
conundrical internal life of the corporation, while applying our
shareholder/stakeholder, public/private distinctions to make sense of it all.
Can it be really all that difficult to heed the insightful warnings of the past
not to take such categorizations as depictions of reality, but rather to
understand them as the semantic representation of difficult but deliberate
choices?110 The dialogue between corporate lawyers and those studying
the corporation and what that term implies111 has only just begun.
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D. CONCLUSION
In the here and now, while we are waiting for signs of the ECJ’s decision’s
impact, they might be coming faster than expected. One day after the
Court had rendered its judgment, the Arbeitsgericht (first instance labor
court) Stuttgart in Germany, too, delivered a telling judgement.112 The
court dismissed the request of Volkswagen’s Betriebsrat (works council)
for temporary relief (einstweiliger Rechtsschutz) against the pending
registration of the newly established company structure of Porsche as a
Societas Europaea. With their action, the workers at Volkswagen had
hoped to prohibit either the registration and/or the co-determination
covenant (Mitbestimmungsvereinbarung) between Porsche’s employer and
its employees, in fear of their own co-determination rights being
dramatically compromised as a consequence of the new co-determination
regime under the Porsche’s Societas Europaea. This regime113 offers the
employer and the employees the possibility to regulate the codetermination by mutual agreement before a fall-back clause kicks in, if
the negotiations fail.114 The primary intention of the German SEBeteiligungsgesetz is to supply a legal framework for “customized forms
of co-determination”.115 Porsche and its own works council had made use
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of this possibility expressly stated in Section 21 SE-Beteiligungsgesetz116
by entering into a covenant on the Porsche employees’ co-determination,
to be arranged in the newly established SE.
One element, in particular, incited Volkswagen’s main objection, namely a
comparatively, because numerically equal allocation of Porsche and
Volkswagen members to the supervisory board in the case that Porsche
Automobil Holding SE acquired a major stake of Volkswagen shares. The
Volkswagen employees argued that this allocation violated democratic
principles. In the likely, even if not imminent case of Porsche acquiring a
majority of Volkswagen shares at a time where the Porsche-VW codetermination battle is not put to rest and VW share prices soar117, the
covenant would result in Volkswagen and Porsche being able to each
delegate the same quorum of employee representatives to the supervisory
board of the SE. In effect, Porsche’s 12,000 employees would have the
same influence within the supervisory board as Volkswagen’s 324,000
employees.118 In light of such numbers, Volkswagen’s objection that this
allocation of representatives violated the Principle of Democracy becomes
quite graphic.119 Following Porsche’s lawyers, the Arbeitsgericht
dismissed the action for temporary relief, with which the VW employees
had tried to stop Porsche’s triumph march. The Court essentially relied on
the consideration that a dispute over the formal or substantive validity of
an SE’s co-determination covenant must not delay the registration of the
116
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company. The Court explicitly recognized that the applicable norms of the
German SE-Beteiligungsgesetz do not contain such an instrument, which –
as the Court observed – would constitute a considerable pressure
instrument (“erhebliches Druckmittel”),120 one, however, that does not
form part of the co-determination negotiation regime under the SE.
Meanwhile, the Court underlined that the validity of the co-determination
covenant would have to be assessed in a regular action as compared to the
temporary relief action brought by the Volkswagen employees.
This case might be more than just a further ripple on the already troubled
seas of European Company Law. The same seems true for the ECJ’s
Volkswagen case. The waters of European company law are travelled by
tankers (The Commission), submarines (investment funds), yachts
(Porsche), exploration boats (expert commissions) and large sailboats in a
state of repair (the member states). Then there are the rafts, paddling boats
and canoes, steered by practitioners and scholars. All these need to get to
shore and climb the stairs to the Lighthouse from where to look out at
what has become of Clive Schmitthoff’s ‘European Company Law
Scene’.121 But, they also need to provide a directing light to the different
sea-farers adventuring between London and Frankfurt, Paris and
Amsterdam and Warsaw. And instead of merely noting that all are being
carried this way or that by the winds of globalization, it might be timely to
consider again, what different concepts of the corporation, des
Unternehmens, la società, l’entreprise, are at stake in this windy weather.
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